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RECENT DECISIONS
unwarranted. Unsuccessful litigants have urged it as new grounds
for appeal and defendants have invoked it to bring in new parties
to share their burden of liability.6 It has been sought to extend the
application of the law to add defendants and now to prevent their
release although there is no evidence to warrant a judgment against
them. The error lay in attempting to create a situation to fit the law
instead of applying it only when all the conditions are present. It
is essential that "a judgment recovered jointly against two or more
defendants * * * has been paid by one or more defendants." The
plaintiff's case must be closed and his judgment collected. Contri-
bution between joint tort-feasors is a gift of the legislature by
statute and this statute derogatory of the common law 7 must be
strictly construed and strictly complied with before the right comes
into existence. This decision properly construes the statute by giving
it a limited application, and again states the opinion of the court that
it does not affect any other section relating to the parties to actions.
J. M. C.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-LIMITATIONS op ACTIONS-THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS AFFECTs AMENDED PLEADINGS.-
Plaintiff sued defendants for the purchase price of a motorboat on
defendants' misrepresentation as to its speed. On the trial plaintiff
learned of its error in not suing defendants as agents for breach of
authority of warranty and asked leave to amend its complaint to
include this cause of action. Both alleged causes of action arose in
1919 and the trial was held in 1930. Held, The trial court had dis-
cretion in permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint, but the
amendment, constituting a new cause of action, was subject to the
bar of the statutory period and defendants had the right to inter-
pose that defense. Harriss v. Tans, 258 N. Y. 229, 179 N. E. 476
(1932).
An action lies against an agent for misrepresentation of author-
ity to warrant concerning his principal's goods.' If the agency is
'For an exhaustive study of this section and the cases relating to it see
Rothschild, Contribution Between Tort-Feasors (1931) 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1.
"1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §345.
' Moore v. Maddock, 251 N. Y. 420, 167 N. E. 572 (1929) ; 1 WILLISrToN,
CONTRACTS (1920) §282: "* * * if on a fair construction of the contract it
appears that the intent was to bind the principal only, according to the better
view the agent is liable, not on the contract, but on an implied warranty of his
authority based on his representation of authority"; TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1924) §130. As to liability on a negotiable instrument when unauthorized
see New Georgia National Bank v. Lippman, 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108
(1928) interpreting §39 of the N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW to mean
that the agent is liable as a principal on the note.
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not disclosed to the third party the agent may be held as a principal.2
Where, however, the agency is disclosed, as in the instant case, the
third party's remedies consist, usually, in suing the agent for breach
of warranty of authority or, of rescinding the contract as concerns
the principal, offering to return the goods and then suing for the
purchase price which is the principal's. The principal may not re-
tain the proceeds of a contract tainted with the fraud or misrepre-
sentation of the agent.3  Mere retention of'the proceeds does not
constitute an approval or ratification of the agent's unauthorized
acts 4 unless it be inconsistent with any other theory.5 The period
of limitation for an action on a simple contract in this jurisdiction
is six years. 6 Actions commenced after the statute has run may
be effectively barred by the defense of the Statute of Limitations 7
and complaints which show this to be so may be dismissed without
the necessity of awaiting trial. 8 Where a complaint apprises the
defendant of the wrong done and is lacking in some detail, necessary,
'Ludwig v. Gillespie, 105 N. Y. 653, 11 N. E. 835 (1887); 1 WLUSTON,
supra note 1, §284.
See Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 (1860) ; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79
(1867); Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199 (1872); American National Bank
v. Wheelock, 82 N. Y. 118 (1880); Deyo v. Hudson, 225 N. Y. 602, 122 N. E.
635 (1919). This is so where the injured parties' action is in rescission. Where,
however, it is for fraudulent misrepresentation and the acts are unauthorized
no recovery is allowed. Freedman v. New York Telephone Co., 256 N. Y. 392,
176 N. E. 543 (1931). A different rule applies as to bank tellers, The
Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Kent County, Md. v. The Butchers' and
Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125 (1857) and freight agents, Bank of Batavia v.
New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E.
433 (1887).
" Baldwin v. Burrows, supra note 3 at 213: "The mere fact that the proceeds
of the contract made by one person in the name of another without authority,
or a portion of them have come to the hands of the latter, is not, of itself,
sufficient to render him liable on the contract."
'Ibid.: "To have that effect, the proceeds must be received not only with
the knowledge, but under such circumstances as to constitute a voluntary adop-
tion of the contract."
"N. Y. C. P. A. §48: "Actions to be commenced within six years. The
following actions must be commenced within six years after the cause of action
has accrued: 1. An action upon a contract obligation or liability express or
implied, except a judgment or sealed instrument."
' Finkelstein and Bergman, Limitations of Actions in Equity in New York
(1931) 5 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 199: "The unfairness of permitting a cause of
action to be held forever as a sword over the head of the debtor or his
descendants was * * * early perceived and a great body of law has arisen that
deals with the practical application of these periods of limitation to actual cases.
Here the requirements of strict justice must give way to practical necessities,
for it is obvious that if six years is the period of limitation for a particular
action, a suit which may be brought on the last day of the sixth year will be
forever barred if it is not brought until the first day of the seventh year."
"In New York, under Civil Practice Rule 107, the defendant may move
within twenty days after the service of the complaint to procure a judgment
dismissing the complaint or one or more causes stated therein where, among
other things, it appears that the cause or causes did not accrue within the time
limited by law for the commencement of an action thereon.
RECENT DECISIONS
but a part of the cause stated in the complaint, the trial court may,
in its discretion permit an amendment to the complaint even though
at the time of the amendment the addition .of another distinct and
separate cause be barred by the running of the statute.9 The problem
in every case is to determine what constitutes an enlargement of
the cause stated in the original complaint and what constitutes a
new and distinct cause.10 The court in the instant case declines to
set forth a definite test by which one may measure. "Perhaps to
some extent the determination must be made pragmatically, based
on considerations of fairness." 11 The tendency is toward liber-
ality,' 2 and not without justification.13 It is sufficient, at this time,
to note that in the case at hand the court is of the opinion that there
is a substantial difference between suing a defendant in the capacity
of principal 14 and subsequently seeking to amend the complaint to
hold the defendant as an agent on the theory of breach of warranty
of authority, after the six-year period had elapsed. It will be in-
teresting to note what effect this decision will have on future pro-
nouncements of the court.
A. K. B.
0 Seaboard Air Line v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290, 36 Sup. Ct. 567 (1916), citing
Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905 (1892) ; Atlantic
and Pacific R. R. v. Laird, 164 U. S. 393, 17 Sup. Ct. 120 (1896) ; Hutchinson
v. Otis, 190 U. S. 552, 23 Sup. Ct. 778 (1903) ; Missouri Kansas & Texas Ry.
v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135 (1913); Crotty v. Chicago, Great
Western Ry. Co., 169 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). See, also, Dietz v. Harris,
221 App. Div. 581, 224 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1st Dept. 1927).
'
0 Luce v. New York C. and St. L. R. R. Co., 213 App. Div. 374, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 784 (4th Dept. 1925), aff'd, 242 N. Y. 519, 152 N. E. 409" (1926) ; Miller
v. Erie R. R. Co., 109 App. Div. 612, 96 N. Y. Supp. 244 (2d Dept. 1905).
Instant case at 243, 179 N. E. at 482.
" Seaboard Air Line v. Renn, supra note 10.
' It is important, of course, that the defendant be apprised of the nature of
the wrong of which the plaintiff complains. But once having been apprised of
it, he should not be permitted to avail himself of a technicality to defeat the
claim set forth substantially by the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff has neglected
to set forth the essential elements of a wrong done, or, having commenced his
action as one for malicious prosecution, he subsequently elects to sue for
slander, Dietz v. Harris, supra note 10, he should be bound by the statute as to
the second cause, as constituting an entirely independent plea. But where, as in
Seaboard Air Line v. Renn, supra note 10, plaintiff stated that he was injured
by reason of the defendant's negligence, stating the nature and course of events,
without stating specifically that the defendant was engaged in interstate com-
merce, it was proper to allow him to amend the complaint to include that
information.
" The court ordered a new trial intimating that plaintiff might recover
upon an obligation, assumed by defendants arising from the warranty concern-
ing the speed of the boat and which was stated imperfectly in the original
complaint.
